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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the interdependence of financial decisions (investment, financing,
dividends and cash-holding) under financial constraints.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors specify and estimate a system of simultaneous
equations with panel data and firm fixed effects by three-stage least squares in a sample of firms from 62
countries from 1996 to 2010.
Findings – The main findings largely corroborate previous studies regarding the interdependence of
financial decisions. The authors also find evidence suggesting that financial constraints have a major
impact on firms’ financial decisions. The results also suggest that financial constraints manifest
themselves in virtually all firms, indicating that such constraints are a matter of degree and not of
kind.
Research limitations/implications – Implications regarding the impact of cash flows on investment
and cash-holding decisions are only partially confirmed.
Practical implications – The results are consistent with the hypothesis that financial constraints
distort the financial policies of firms. For the purpose of formulating policies that reduce these
distortions, the authors emphasize the role of the availability of internal funds and the recoverable
fraction of assets in easing financial constraints, thus allowing for greater investment on the part of
firms.
Social implications – The results suggest that regulators should promote policies that reduce the
dependence of corporate investment on internally generated cash flows.
Originality/value – Unlike previous studies, the authors account for the direct impact endogenous
variables could have on each other. In addition, they explore the impact of each country’s particular legal
environment on the pledgeability of assets at the company level.
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1. Introduction
In October 2018, the shares of the global brewing company Anheuser-Busch InBev had their
most significant drop in a decade when it announced a 50 per cent cut in its dividends. Felipe
Dutra, its chief financial officer, justified the sharp dividend reduction as necessary to pay
down quickly its $108bn in debt from the acquisition of SABMiller in 2016 (Abboud, 2018).
AB InBev is but one concrete example of how intertwined investment, financing and
dividends decisions are in the corporate world. In this paper, we approach such a problem
from a broad cross-country perspective. Our results help the understanding of the drivers of
joint financial decisions and how financial constraints affect firms in different institutional
environments.
In the credit market, informational asymmetries between individuals can cause credit
rationing (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Moreover, problems of
information asymmetry can raise the cost of external financing to the point where it
becomes prohibitive for certain firms (Greenwald, Stiglitz, & Weiss, 1984; Myers & Majluf,
1984). Given these market imperfections, investment decisions could prove sensitive to the
availability of internal funds and firm borrowing capacity. Besides, firms could also demand
cash to alleviate the effects of financial constraints on future investments.
Among the most important recent theoretical developments in this stream of literature
are the contributions of Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) and Almeida and Campello
(2007). Concerning the former, the main implication is that firms with higher asset
pledgeability have greater access to credit, can make more investments and have higher
sensitivity of investment to cash flows vis-à-vis firms with lower asset pledgeability. In the
latter, Acharya et al. (2007) show that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs
demand liquidity and thus the demand for cash should be sensitive to internally generated
cash flows. These authors also show that the sensitivity of debt to cash flows is positive
(negative) for firms with high (low) hedging needs.
Notwithstanding this, credit constraints imply that, contrary to the proposition put
forward by Modigliani and Miller (1958), financial decisions are interdependent. Under
credit rationing, investments in fixed assets, the maintenance of cash reserves, and dividend
distributions are subject to the availability of internal and external funds. In other words,
with the imposition of capital constraints, a firm’s various forms of expenditure compete for
limited funds, and thus financial decisions are determined simultaneously.
Although financial decisions could be determined simultaneously, investment, financing
and liquidity demand models are generally estimated separately in the empirical literature.
Some exceptions are the studies of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), Fama (1974), McCabe (1979),
McDonald, Jacquillat, and Nussenbaum (1975), Mueller (1967) and Peterson and Benesh
(1983), among others. These studies are characterized by using systems of simultaneous
equations to analyze the relations among firms’major financial decisions.
We empirically examine the implications of the models developed by Acharya et al.
(2007) and Almeida and Campello (2007) in a context of simultaneity among firms’ financial
decisions in a sample of 62 countries. By taking the interdependence of financial decisions
into account, we grasp a broader understanding of the decision-making process. As Mueller
(1967, p. 58) states, “a complete understanding of this decision process can be obtained only
by explicitly accounting for the numerous interactions which are a result of this
simultaneity.” Exploring this problem in a cross-country sample enables us to account for
institutional differences that might give us a universal insight into the problem.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we update the pioneering
studies of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), McCabe (1979), McDonald et al. (1975) and Peterson




data and firm fixed effects, as proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt, andWyhowski (1992), rather
than a series of cross-sectional estimations.
Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao (2014), Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011) and Gatchev,
Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) also analyze firms’ financial decisions by estimating a system of
equations. In these studies, the system of equations only includes the explanatory variables
considered to be predetermined and exogenous. Unlike the present study, those equations do
not include the other endogenous variables among the explanatory variables, thus ignoring
the direct impact these variables could have on financial decisions.
Other recent studies related to ours include Agliardi, Agliardi, and Spanjers (2016) which
investigated the joint capital structure, dividend and liquidity demand decisions of firms
using a behavioral approach. The authors model financial decisions under an ambiguity
theory framework and find that ambiguity aversion has a first-order impact on those
financial decisions. Exploratory empirical results from a cross-country sample provide
initial support to the authors’ model. Baños-Caballero, García-Teruel, and Martínez-Solano
(2014) study the effect of financial constraints on working capital investment, and how their
interplay affects financial performance in a sample of British companies. The authors find
that for more financially constrained firms the optimal investment in working capital is
lower than otherwise less constrained companies, which suggests severe impacts due to
higher financing costs or greater capital rationing. Finally, Wang (2010) explores the
interrelationship between investment, financing and dividend policies for high-tech firms in
Taiwan and China. The author finds evidence that firms from that industry adopt different
financial strategies subject to their own environments. None of these studies, however, has
the same breadth and scope of ours in terms of countries, industries and financial decisions
studied.
Finally, we explore the impact of the legal environment on firms’ borrowing capacity to
eliminate an alternative hypothesis associated with the results of Almeida and Campello
(2007). These authors explore the variability in asset composition among firms as a source of
variation in the pledgeability of firm assets. However, the composition of assets is partly
determined by industry and, thus, the measure used by Almeida and Campello (2007) could
be capturing other industry-related effects associated with corporate investment and not
only variations in asset pledgeability. To explore the variability in asset pledgeability in
more depth, we measure this variable conditional on each country’s particular legal
environment. We believe that the results of this strategy constitute original evidence that is
complementary to Almeida and Campello’s (2007) regarding a credit multiplier at the firm
level.
We estimate the system of equations for a sample of 8,791 firms from 62 different
countries[1] for the period from 1996 to 2010. The main results can be summarized as
follows:
 The sensitivity of investment to cash flows is positive and increasing in the
pledgeability of assets for both groups of firms, but the marginal effect of cash flows
on investment is higher for firms classified as constrained.
 The sensitivity of cash to cash flows is positive and independent of hedging needs
for firms classified as constrained and positive for firms classified as unconstrained
with low hedging needs, but the marginal effect of cash flows on cash savings is
higher for constrained firms.
 The sensitivity of debt to cash flows is negative for both groups of firms and
independent of hedging needs, but the marginal effect of cash flows on debt




Our results suggest that the main financial decisions are interdependent and are sensitive to
the availability of internal funds, supporting predictions about the effects of credit market
frictions on the firm’s financial policy. Specifically, our results are consistent with the
following predictions:
 there is a credit multiplier effect at the firm level;
 firms save cash from cash flows to overcome future financial constraints; and
 firms prefer internal funds to external financing.
Our results also suggest that the effects of financial constraints are more severe for firms
classified as constrained, corroborating the results of cross-countries studies by Becker and
Sivadasan (2010), Francis, Hasan, Song, and Waisman (2013), Islam and Mozumdar (2007),
Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2006) and Kusnadi andWei (2011).
Overall, we believe that our results convey a critical message: financial constraints
manifest themselves virtually in all firms, possibly at different intensities, indicating that
the restrictions are a matter of degree and not of kind. Finally, despite methodological
differences, our results largely corroborate those of Dhrymes and Kurz (1967), McCabe
(1979), McDonald et al. (1975), Mueller (1967), Peterson and Benesh (1983) and, more
recently, Gatchev et al. (2010).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our
research hypotheses. In Section 3, we present the empirical model, the estimation procedure
and the sample selection criteria. In Section 4, we discuss our main results. Finally, in
Section 5, we present our final comments and advice for regulatory bodies.
2. Research hypotheses
The hypotheses in this study stem from the empirical implications of models proposed by
Acharya et al. (2007) and Almeida and Campello (2007) for the financial decisions of a firm.
Regarding investment decisions, we formulate the following research hypothesis:
H1. Investment-cash flow sensitivity is positive and increasing in the recoverable
fraction of assets for financially constrained firms and null for financially
unconstrained firms.
According to Almeida and Campello (2007), if credit is rationed and the severity of the
rationing is a decreasing function of the recoverable fraction of assets, firms with a higher
fraction of recoverable assets have greater access to credit and can make more investments
vis-à-vis firms with a smaller fraction of recoverable assets. As shown by Almeida and
Campello (2007), given a positive shock to the availability of internal funds, the investments
of constrained firms with a greater fraction of recoverable assets respond with greater
intensity when compared to the investments of constrained firms with a smaller fraction of
recoverable assets, due to higher endogenous variation in credit capacity of the former vis-à-
vis the latter. Almeida and Campello (2007) call this the credit multiplier effect.
Regarding the firm’s demand for liquidity, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H2. The cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive (null) for constrained firms with high
(low) hedging needs.
In the model of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), the demand for liquidity arises as
a means of ensuring that the firm is capable of investing in the future. However, as pointed




among states of nature depends on the firm’s hedging needs. Constrained firms with high
hedging needs (i.e. firms for which the correlation between investment opportunities and
cash flows is low) choose to increase their cash holdings in periods of high cash flows as a
means of transferring such funds to states of nature in which cash flows are low. Thus, the
cash holdings of such firms should be positively sensitive to cash flows. For constrained
firms with low hedging needs, increasing the borrowing capacity is a more efficient means
of increasing the investment capacity in states of nature in which cash flows are high. Thus,
such firms require no (additional) cash holdings for hedging purposes, and their cash flow
sensitivity of cash should be null.
We formulate the following research hypothesis regarding the decision to issue new debt:
H3. The sensitivity of debt to cash flows is positive (negative) for constrained firms
with high (low) hedging needs.
In the model of Acharya et al. (2007), constrained firms with high hedging needs use cash
flows generated at times when investment opportunities are low as collateral for new loans
and thus further increase their cash reserves. Therefore, such firms should have a positive
cash flow sensitivity of debt. Constrained firms with low hedging needs, in turn, do not
demand cash for hedging purposes and therefore use surplus cash flows to reduce debt and
thereby increase their future borrowing capacity. Thus, such firms should have a negative
cash flow sensitivity of debt.
As for financially unconstrained firms, Acharya et al. (2007) argue that, due to other
possible benefits and/or costs associated with cash holdings and debt, cash and debt
sensitivities to cash flows could differ from zero, but such sensitivities should be
independent of the firm’s hedging needs.
3. Research method
This section presents the empirical model used to test the research hypotheses, describes the
estimation process and, finally, details the sample selection procedures and a priori
classification of the firms as either financially constrained or unconstrained.
3.1 Empirical model and estimation procedure
As noted by Mueller (1967), a thorough understanding of a firm’s decisions can only be
achieved by explicitly recognizing the various interactions that result from the simultaneity
among its decisions. With this purpose in mind, we estimate the following system of
simultaneous equations for firm i and period t:
Ii;t ¼ a0i þ a1DCashi;t þ a2Divi;t þ a3DDebti;t þ a4DNWCi;t þ a5Ki;t1 þ a6Qi;t1
þa7CFi;t þ a8RFAi;t þ a9 CFi;t  RFAi;t
 þ m t þ « Ii;t (1)
DCashi;t ¼ b 0i þ b 1Ii;t þ b 2Divi;t þ b 3DDebti;t þ b 4DNWCi;t þ b 5Cashi;t1 þ b 6Sizei;t
þ b 7Qi;t þ b 8CFi;t þ b 9 CFi;t  HNi




Divi;t ¼ g 0i þ g 1Ii;t þ g 2DCashi;t þ g 3DDebti;t þ g 4DNWCi;t þ g 5Divi;t1 þ g 6Sizei;t
þ g 7Qi;t þ g 8CFi;t þ t t þ «Divi;t (3)
DDebti;t ¼ p 0i þ p 1Ii;t þ p 2DCashi;t þ p 3Divi;t þ p 4DNWCi;t þ p 5Debti;t1 þ p 6Sizei;t
þp 7Qi;t þ p 8CFi;t þ p 9 CFi;t  HNi
 þ p 10RFAi;t þ p 10Riski;t þ k t þ «DDebti;t
(4)
This is not a structural system in which the equations derive directly from a firm’s
optimization problem. The system proposed herein intends merely to assess the relations
among the endogenous variables and these variables’ relations with their main
determinants, which are derived from the financial literature, without inferring causality.
The endogenous variables of the system are an investment in physical capital (Ii,t),
changes in cash holdings (DCashi,t), dividends (Divi,t) and change in short- and long-term
debt (DDebti,t). The explanatory variables of the system are lagged capital stock (Ki,t-1),
lagged cash holdings (Cashi,t-1), dividends paid the previous year (Divi,t-1), the lagged stock
of debt (Debti,t-1), changes in net working capital (DNWCi,t), current and lagged Tobin’s Q
(Qi,t, Qi,t-1), firm size (Sizei,t), cash flows generated over the period (CFi,t), the recoverable
fraction of firm assets (RFAi,t), the interaction between these latter two variables, the
interaction between the firm’s cash flows and hedging needs (HNi)[2] and the firm’s
operational risk (Riski,t-1). A table with the expected signs of these variables is available
upon request.
We applied the within transformation to the data to eliminate firm fixed effects, and we
estimate the transformed system using the three-stage least squares method (3SLS).
Cornwell et al. (1992) show that the maximum likelihood estimation of the original system is
equivalent to that of the system after the within the transformation, thus justifying the
estimation procedure adopted herein. We include dummy year variables to capture time
effects.
3.2 Sample, data collection and treatment
The initial sample includes all firms in the manufacturing sector – Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes 2000-3999 – whose accounting and market information are
available in the Compustat Global and Compustat North America databases for the period
from 1996 to 2010[3]. All values are converted to US$ and adjusted for inflation to constant
2010 dollars using the Consumer Pricing Index (CPI). The exchange rates are from the
International Monetary Fund[4], and the Consumer Price Index is collected from the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics. We drop from the sample those firms in which the following
(firm-year) situations are observed:
 capital stock of less than US$5m (December 2010 values);
 sales or asset growth greater than 100 per cent (lower limit bound at 100 per cent);
and
 a Tobin’s Q (current and lagged) that is negative or greater than 10.
In defining these exclusions, we follow the lead of Almeida and Campello (2007), who also
use similar selection criteria. In addition, each firm must present at least two years of




The final sample consists of 60,488 observations (8,791 firms, unbalanced panel) from 62
countries.
Almeida and Campello (2007) explore the variability in the composition of assets among
firms as a source of variation in the recoverable fraction of assets. However, we could argue
that asset composition is determined partly by the firm’s industry and thus the measure
used by those authors could be capturing other industry effects associated with corporate
investment and not only variations in the recoverable fraction of assets. We believe that by
combining firm- and country-level variables, we can mitigate this alternative hypothesis,
and we thus hope that our study contributes to a better understanding of the factors that
affect the financial decisions of firms in a credit-constrained environment.
To explore the variability of the pledgeability of a firm’s assets arising from the legal
environment, we use a variable at the country level developed and computed by Djankov,
Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008). Asset tangibility alone only measures the fraction of
assets that can be offered as collateral and does not indicate how much of them can be
recovered by creditors in the event of default (the true collateralizable value of the assets).
Therefore, to determine the recoverable fraction of assets, the tangibility of firm assets is
multiplied by the efficiency of debt enforcement at the country level. Debt enforcement is
designed by Djankov et al. (2008) and measures the fraction of assets that can be recovered
by creditors in the event of debt default. This measure is based on the procedures (most
likely) used in each country to handle cases of corporate bankruptcy and accounts for costs,
time, discount rate and so forth, of bankruptcy proceedings for a set of 88 countries.
Following Acharya et al. (2007), we classify firms concerning their hedging needs based
on the correlation between a firm’s cash flows and the industry’s sales growth in the
subsequent three years. We classify as having high hedging needs those firms whose
correlation is statistically negative and for which the number of firms within the industry is
greater than or equal to two in at least 75 per cent of the observations used to compute the
correlation.
Firms are a priori classified between financially constrained and unconstrained
according to the size of their total assets. Almeida et al. (2004), Almeida and Campello (2007),
Dasgupta et al., (2011), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Kusnadi and Wei (2011), among
others, also use size to ex-ante classify firms in these groups. For each country, industry
(two-digit SIC code), and year, firms in the three lower (upper) deciles are classified as
constrained (unconstrained). At least five firms with data for total assets in each country,
industry and year are required[5]. For robustness, and guided by the evidence presented in
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we also report the results based on the financial slack criteria
(we use our Cash variable as a measure of financial slack). In each country and year, we
classify as constrained (unconstrained) those firms in the three lower (upper) deciles of our
financial slack measure.
Finally, to mitigate problems arising from outliers, we adopt the following procedures:
 we truncate the asset tangibility variable above one (100 per cent); and
 we winsorize all other continuous variables at the firm level (except for firm size) at
1 per cent in both tails.
Table I presents the operationalization of each variable. These definitions follow the
pertinent literature, except for the recoverable fraction of assets.
4. Results
We present the analysis of the results in two parts. The first includes the analysis of the




analyze and discuss the main results of the estimation of the system of equations. Several
robustness tests were conducted, and the results remained the same (qualitatively). These
additional tests are available upon request.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Given the role of the efficiency of debt enforcement in this study, we highlight the relation of
this variable with the asset tangibility variable. In countries such as Turkey, Brazil and
Venezuela, where the average asset tangibility is higher than the overall mean, the
recoverable fractions of such assets are, on average, only 5.7, 11.3 and 11.9 per cent,
respectively. Therefore, even though the firms in these countries have, on average, greater
levels of asset tangibility than their peers in other countries, the fraction of assets that could
be recovered by creditors in a possible default of the firm is minimal.
These examples, though specific, are not exceptions, as can be noted in Figure 1, which
presents a scatter plot of the efficiency of debt enforcement and average asset tangibility,
together with a trend line. As can be seen, there is a negative linear relationship between
these variables that is confirmed by the negative slope coefficient of the trend line
(statistically significant at 1 per cent). This inverse relation suggests that, in studies
involving firms from different countries, measuring the pledgeability of assets using
tangibility alone could lead to serious measurement errors.
Table II presents the descriptive statistics calculated separately for the following
subsamples[6]: firms classified as unconstrained, firms classified as constrained, and both
types (total). From these statistics, we can ascertain the differences between the groups of
firms regarding the main variables. By comparing the actual differences with those expected




Variable Formula/operationalization Compustat item
Investment in physical
capital (I )
Capital expenditures/Total assets capx/at
Change in cash
holdings (DCash)
Change in Cash/Total Assets D che/at
Dividends (Div) Dividends/Total assets dvt/at
Change in debt
(DDebt)
Change in Short- and Long-Term Debt/Total Assets D(dlcþ dltt)/at
Change in net working
capital (DNWC )
Change in (Current Assets less Cash minus Current
Liabilities less Short-Term Debt)/Total Assets
D((act – che) – (lct – dlc))/
at
Capital stock (K ) Net fixed assets/Total assets ppent/at
Cash holdings (Cash) Cash/Total assets che/at
Debt stock (Debt ) Short- and Long-Term debt/Total assets (dlcþ dltt)/at
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market value of Assets/Total Assets (atþ csho prcc_f – ceq
– txdb)/at





(CashþAccounts receivableþ Inventoriesþ Net




Size (Size) Natural log of total assets Ln(at)
Hedging needs (HN ) See text
Operational risk (Risk) Return on Assets (ROA) standard deviation. Moving






According to the models of Acharya et al. (2007) and Almeida and Campello (2007), all being
held constant, unconstrained firms tend to invest more, pay higher dividends and maintain
lower cash holdings. Consistent with expectations, there are statistically significant
differences between the two groups of firms in terms of the investment (I), dividend (Div)
and cash holding (Cash) variables.
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2011) show that financial constraints on future
investments could distort the constrained firm’s current investment policy. Such constraints
lead firms to prefer investments with lower payback, less risk, greater liquidity and greater
collateralizable value. The differences observed between the two groups of firms regarding
investment in physical capital (K) and the recoverable fraction of assets (RFA) are consistent
with this view.
Almeida et al. (2011) also argue that the potential impact of high debt on future financing
costs can distort current investments, creating an additional cost of borrowing. Thus,
constrained firms tend to use debt more conservatively vis-à-vis unconstrained firms. The
differences observed between the groups of firms concerning debt stock (Debt) corroborate
this prediction.
Regarding the remaining variables, there are also statistically significant differences
between the two groups. These differences can generally be explained based on the theories,
and empirical evidence discussed so far. Before concluding this analysis, we underline that
the observed differences are consistent with the differences expected between firms with
differential access to credit, suggesting that the adopted criterion is appropriate.
4.2 Main results
Table III shows the results for the estimations of the system (1)-(4) using the minimum chi-
squared generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (GMM3SLS). We present our
results in four columns, with two columns for each group, unconstrained and constrained
firms. Columns I and II refer to the firm size and financial slack criteria, respectively.
Consider the results for the endogenous variables included among the explanatory ones
for each equation and the variation in net working capital. Among these variables, four are
representative of the use of funds – investment in fixed assets, demand for liquidity,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































funds – the issuance of new debt. For constrained firms, the prediction is that in the
equations that represent the use of funds, the other variables representing this category will
have negative coefficients, as such variables compete for scarce resources, while the variable
representing the source of funds will have a positive coefficient, as the increased availability
of external funds enables higher expenditures. The results generally confirm this
expectation and just a few qualitative differences are observed between the classification
criteria.
For unconstrained firms, the expectation is that, in the equations that represent the use of













I II I II
Panel A: Investment equation I (t)
DCash (t) 0.0189*** (2.61) 0.0001 (0.01) 0.0381*** (4.42) 0.1593*** (11.58)
Div (t) 0.0253 (0.40) 0.1683*** (2.82) 0.1397* (1.72) 0.3260*** (3.01)
DDebt (t) 0.0867*** (11.74) 0.0612*** (7.55) 0.1411*** (16.31) 0.1442*** (16.66)
DNWC (t) 0.0309*** (4.52) 0.0029 (0.56) 0.0632*** (9.23) 0.1137*** (14.42)
Q (t1) 0.0024*** (7.76) 0.0028*** (11.17) 0.0044*** (10.70) 0.0058*** (7.84)
CF (t) 0.0076 (0.84) 0.0166* (1.73) 0.0033 (0.25) 0.0162 (1.36)
RFA (t) 0.0731*** (19.97) 0.1032*** (26.49) 0.1242*** (21.36) 0.0907*** (15.25)
CF RFA (t) 0.0725*** (5.24) 0.0409*** (3.22) 0.0641*** (3.63) 0.0889*** (4.92)
Adj. R-squared 14.3% 11.0% 17.5% 19.1%
Panel B: liquidity demand equation – DCash (t)
I (t) 3.2772*** (13.81) 3.7850*** (14.04) 0.9198*** (7.21) 0.1285*** (4.04)
Div (t) 0.4359(1.57) 0.1756 (0.59) 0.3180 (1.53) 0.0227 (0.38)
DDebt (t) 0.2042*** (5.63) 0.0171 (0.36) 0.0210 (0.74) 0.0022 (0.32)
DNWC (t) 0.1315*** (4.72) 0.3284*** (14.02)0.2257*** (13.44) 0.0077 (1.40)
CF (t) 0.0607*** (2.76) 0.2992*** (14.55) 0.2262*** (16.57) 0.0207*** (4.68)
CF HN (t) 0.0503* (1.79) 0.0701** (2.34) 0.0188 (0.78) 0.0092 (1.22)
Adj. R-squared 167.4% 83.3% 12.1% 74.2%
Panel C: dividend equation – Div (t)
I (t) 0.1022*** (4.41) 0.0302 (1.56) 0.0611*** (3.91) 0.0530*** (3.36)
DCash (t) 0.0124*** (4.29) 0.0103*** (5.02) 0.0083*** (2.30) 0.0135*** (3.01)
DDebt (t) 0.0040 (1.14) 0.0069* (1.84) 0.0025 (0.59) 0.0190*** (5.53)
DNWC (t) 0.0142*** (5.70) 0.0152*** (6.35) 0.0095*** (3.29) 0.0158*** (5.47)
CF (t) 0.0162*** (8.14) 0.0160*** (9.87) 0.0114*** (5.07) 0.0203*** (9.03)
Adj. R-squared 11.8% 10.6% 8.3% 7.3%
Panel D: debt equation – DDebt (t)
I (t) 0.9362*** (4.84) 0.1464 (1.11) 0.1106 (0.86) 0.0754 (0.40)
DCash (t) 0.1815*** (7.41) 0.0940*** (7.62) 0.2094*** (10.48) 0.2753*** (6.44)
Div (t) 1.2065*** (6.90) 0.3433*** (2.58) 0.2294 (1.17) 1.6464*** (5.21)
DNWC (t) 0.5001*** (29.99) 0.2458*** (19.49) 0.4253*** (29.51) 0.5924*** (36.73)
CF (t) 0.2587*** (13.82)0.1523*** (12.59)0.2613*** (18.39)0.3322*** (17.60)
CF HN (t) 0.0439(1.14) 0.0179 (0.77) 0.0160 (0.59) 0.0085 (0.25)
Adj. R-squared 30.5% 27.7% 34.8% 40.6%
Notes: We only report the coefficients for the main variables (complete tables are available upon request).
The t-statistics are in brackets. The superscripts ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and
10% levels, respectively. Columns I and II refer to the firm size and financial slack criteria, respectively. See
Table I for details on the computation of the variables included in the regressions. In total, 60,488




source of funds will have statistically significant coefficients. The results, however, do not
confirm this expectation. In most cases, the sign of the coefficient of these variables is
consistent with the expected behavior of financially constrained firms. For example, in the
equation for investments in fixed assets, the issuance of new debt has a positive coefficient,
indicating that increases in the availability of external funds relax the investment
restrictions of such firms. Still, in the investment equation, the change in net working capital
has a negative coefficient (firm size criterion), suggesting that these variables compete for
scarce resources.
As for the equation for the issuance of new debt, the expectation is that the variables
representing the use of funds have positive coefficients for both groups of firms, since
increases in these variables require more funding, regardless of the firm’s financial situation.
Except for investments in fixed assets and dividends in the case of constrained firms, such
expectations are confirmed. The exceptions could suggest that increases in investments and
dividends are funded largely by other sources, mainly internal, given the high cost of
external financing for this group.
Let’s focus on our three research hypotheses. According to H1, the sensitivity of
investment to cash flows should be positive and increasing in the recoverable fraction of
assets for constrained firms and zero for unconstrained firms. The sensitivity of investment
to cash flows is computed for various values of the distribution of the recoverable fraction of
the assets. These results are not reported but are available upon request.
The sensitivity of investment to cash flows is positive and statistically significant at the
1 per cent level for the constrained group. Moreover, the coefficients of the interaction
between cash flows and the recoverable fraction of assets are positive and statistically
significant at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that the sensitivity of investment to cash flows
is increasing in the recoverable fraction of assets for this group of firms. All these results
supportH1.
Qualitatively similar results are found for the unconstrained group. Except for the lower
levels of the recoverable fraction of assets under the financial slack criteria, the sensitivity of
investment to cash flows is positive and statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level at
most) for this group of firms. The coefficients of the interaction between cash flows and the
recoverable fraction of assets are positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level,
suggesting that the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is increasing in the recoverable
fraction of assets for the group of unconstrained firms. This evidence does not corroborate
that presented by Almeida and Campello (2007) in a sample of US firms.
For unconstrained firms, the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is expected to be
zero. The results, however, indicate that such firms behave similarly to firms classified as
financially constrained. One explanation for this fact is that cash flow signals changes in the
marginal productivity of capital that are not properly captured by the measures usually
used for this purpose (Tobin’s Q). However, based on the arguments presented by Almeida
and Campello (2007), this alternative hypothesis could not explain the increasing sensitivity
of investment to cash flows in the recoverable fraction of assets, unless the latter variable
was also signalling changes in the marginal productivity of capital. Therefore, the most
reasonable explanation seems to be that financial constraints are manifest in nearly all
firms, possibly to different degrees. These results, therefore, suggest the rejection of H1.
Despite this, our results regarding the sensitivity of investment to cash flows corroborate
those of Becker and Sivadasan (2010), Francis et al. (2013) and Islam and Mozumdar (2007),
in cross-country settings.
Regarding the marginal effects of a one standard deviation change in cash flows on




in the median of the recoverable fraction of assets under the firm size classification criterion,
these effects are 0.0029 for unconstrained firms, that is, approximately 7 per cent of the
median value of the investment in this group and 0.0074 for constrained firms, that is,
approximately 21 per cent of the median value of the investment in this group. These
figures, therefore, suggest that the investments of firms classified as constrained are twice
as sensitive to a variation in the availability of internal funds when compared with firms
classified as unconstrained.
In the demand for liquidity equation, we expect that only constrained firms with high
hedging needs demand liquidity. The results, however, do not support this expectation and
the findings of Acharya et al. (2007) and suggest that all firms classified as constrained
require liquidity to ease restrictions on future investments.
For unconstrained firms, the expectation is that the cash flow sensitivity of cash will not
be correlated with firm hedging needs. However, the coefficient of the interaction between
cash flows and hedging needs is negative and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level
(firm size) and the 5 per cent level (financial slack criterion), suggesting that the sensitivity
of cash to cash flows varies with hedging needs. The results for both groups of firms thus
suggest the rejection of H2. Again, our results are consistent with other cross-countries
studies. Khurana et al. (2006) and Kusnadi andWei (2011) also report evidence that the cash
flow sensitivity of cash is positive for both groups of firms but higher for those classified as
constrained.
Regarding the marginal effects on the demand for liquidity of a variation of one
standard deviation in cash flows, there are substantial differences between the two
groups of firms. Under the firm size classification criterion, this effect is 0.0321 for
constrained firms, approximately 36 per cent of the standard deviation of the demand for
liquidity in this group[7]. In the case of unconstrained firms, the marginal effect is 0.0045
for those with low hedging needs and 0.0008 for those with high hedging needs. These
effects represent approximately 7 and 1.2 per cent, respectively, of the standard deviation
of the demand for liquidity in this group of firms. Therefore, among firms classified as
constrained, the demand for liquidity is more sensitive to variations in cash flows than
among firms classified as unconstrained.
In the equation for the issuance of new debt, cash flows have a negative coefficient that is
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level for both groups of firms. The interaction
between cash flows and hedging needs has coefficients that are not statistically significant.
These results indicate that, regardless of their financial situation and hedging needs, firms
have a negative debt to cash flow sensitivity. For constrained firms, the prediction is that
constrained firms with high hedging needs have a positive sensitivity of debt to cash flows.
The results do not support this expectation and are in contrast to the findings presented by
Acharya et al. (2007) and suggest that there is no difference in the sensitivity of debt to cash
flows between constrained firms with high and low hedging needs. The results for both
groups of firms, although broadly consistent with the previous evidence, suggest the
rejection ofH3.
Regarding the marginal effects on the issuance of new debt of a one standard deviation
change in cash flows, there is a substantial difference between the two groups. Under the
firm size classification criterion, this effect is 0.0371 for constrained firms, approximately
40 per cent of the standard deviation of the issuance of new debt in this group. In the case of
unconstrained firms, the marginal effect is 0.0191, approximately 22 per cent of the
standard deviation of the issuance of new debt in this group. These differences are in




relation between external financing and cash flows is more complementary in the case of
financially constrained firms vis-à-vis unconstrained firms.
In short, our results suggest that financial constraints have a major impact on firms’
financial decisions. Although we reject our hypotheses because the expected differences
between the two groups of firms are not found, the implications regarding the impact of cash
flows on firms’ investment and cash decisions are partly confirmed. That is, the sensitivity
of investment to cash flows is positive and increasing in the recoverable fraction of assets,
and the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive. The results therefore indicate that virtually
all firms suffer from credit restrictions to some degree and are consistent with the previous
cross-country studies of Becker and Sivadasan (2010), Francis et al. (2013), Islam and
Mozumdar (2007), Khurana et al. (2006) and Kusnadi andWei (2011).
5. Concluding remarks
This study aims to empirically investigate the implications of the models developed by
Acharya et al. (2007) and Almeida and Campello (2007) in a context of simultaneity among
firms’ financial decisions. To eliminate the alternative hypothesis that the sensitivity of
investment to cash flows varies by industry and not by firms’ asset tangibility, we use a
sample of international firms in conjunction with a country-level measure developed by
Djankov et al. (2008). We believe that these advances provide original evidence regarding
the credit multiplier at the firm level in a sample of firms frommultiple countries.
To empirically investigate the implications proposed by Acharya et al. (2007) and
Almeida and Campello (2007), we formulate three research hypotheses. The results suggest
the rejection of the three hypotheses, as the expected differences between constrained and
unconstrained firms are not confirmed.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that financial constraints distort
the investment and financing policies of firms. To formulate policies that reduce these
distortions, we emphasize the role of the availability of internal funds and the
recoverable fraction of assets in easing financial constraints, thus allowing for greater
investment on the part of firms. This result suggests that regulators should promote policies
that reduce the dependence of corporate investment on internally generated cash flows.
Based on the literature and the findings of this study, regulatory bodies should promote:
 an environment with low-interest rates, as relatively high-interest rates amplify the
effects of information problems in the credit market (Stiglitz &Weiss, 1981);
 a financial intermediation structure that provides for the greater flow of information
among agents, to reduce information problems in the credit market (Greenwald
et al., 1984); and
 laws that allow creditors expeditious access to assets provided as collateral in
lending operations, at low cost and with the best possible use of such assets
(Djankov et al., 2008).
Notes
1. The list of countries included and the distribution of the observations in the final sample by
country and year are available upon request.
2. For firms with higher hedging-needs, HNi = 1.
3. Cross-country studies based on accounting data are always subject to the criticism regarding




thorough and comprehensive procedures for data standardization (Standard & Poor’s, 2002). We
thank an anonymous referee for this remark.
4. For Taiwan, the exchange rates are collected from the National Statistics, Republic of China
(Taiwan) website (http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5).
5. The distribution of observations by industry and financial status is available upon request.
6. For conciseness, we report only the results for the firm size classification criterion. The results for
the financial slack criterion are similar and available upon request.
7. In the case of demand for liquidity and new debt issuance, the standard deviation is used for
purposes of comparison, as the mean and median for these variables are very close to zero.
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